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Multi-channel parallel continuous variable quantum key distribution with Gaussian modulation
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State Key Laboratory of Advanced Optical Communication Systems and Networks,
Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200240, China
We propose a novel scheme for continuous variable quantum key distribution(CV-QKD) using the subcarrier
multiplexing technique which was employed in microwave photonics. This scheme allows to distribute N chan-
nels independent Gaussian modulated CV-QKD in parallel with one laser source and several phase modulators.
We analyze the influence of nonlinear signal mixing and the security in the asymptotic limit. Results indicate
that by using this multiplexing technique, each channel will be introduced a non-Gaussian extra source noise,
resulting slightly short of the maximum transmission distance, while the total secret key rate can be considerably
increased. This scheme could also be used for key distribution for multi-users and combined with the WDM
devices it has the potential to construct a CV-QKD network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD), as a major practical ap-
plication of quantum information, allows two distant parties to
share a common secret key for cryptography in an untrusted
environment[1–3]. Its security is guaranteed by the laws of
quantum mechanics. QKD with continuous-variable, which
is an alternative to the single-photon-based discrete-variable
quantum key distribution(DV-QKD), encodes information on
the quadratures of a Gaussian state[4]. Any eavesdropping
will introduce extra noise between two legal communication
parties, who can realize Eve’s existence by detecting the ex-
cess noise.
The Gaussian modulated CV-QKD protocols, which have
been experimentally demonstrated both in laboratory[5–
8] and field test[9], are proven secure against collective
attacks[10, 11] and coherent attacks[12, 13]. They use ho-
modyne detectors instead of the single-photon counters em-
ployed in DV-QKD systems, and are more attractive from a
practical point of view. By using the multi-dimensional re-
verse reconciliation[14, 15], the secure transmission distance
can be extended to as long as 80km[8].
Most of the existing CV-QKD systems are pulsed systems
and the secret key bit rate R can be expressed as R = frepK
where frep denotes the pulse repetition rate and K is the se-
cret key rate(bit per pulse). Comparing with classical com-
munication systems, the secret key bit rate of CV-QKD is still
low, ranging from several bits/s to hundreds of kbits/s at the
distance of more than 25km[6–9]. There are three possible
approaches to solve this problem. The first one is to improve
the secret key rate K, which is a diminishing function of the
transmission distance and sensitive to the excess noise. So at
long transmission distance the secret key rate is much smaller
than 10−3 bit per pulse. The second approach is to increase the
frequency of pulse repetition rate, which requires faster data
acquisition cards, wider bandwidth of quantum detectors and
the higher speed of post-processing procedure.
The third approach is to use the multiplexing technique,
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which allows to deliver N independent secret keys in a single
fiber. This method was initially realized by using the wave-
length division multiplexing(WDM) devices, which needs N
coherent laser sources with different central frequencies, and
each channel needs individual amplitude and phase mod-
ulators. So the WDM scheme can be just deemed as a
combination of several independent QKD systems. Interest-
ingly, the subcarrier multiplexing technique, which was em-
ployed in the field of microwave photonics and the radio-on-
fiber(ROF) systems, has been proven useful in the BB84 pro-
tocol recently[16–18]. In their scheme, the sender Alice ran-
domly encodes one of the discrete phases {0, π/2, π, 3π/2} on
several radio-frequency(RF) oscillators and the receiver Bob
decodes them by using the oscillators of the identical frequen-
cies as Alice. This method requires a frequency locking mod-
ule between two distant parties, which may increase the com-
plexity of the whole system.
Inspired by this method, we propose a new scheme to em-
ploy the subcarrier multiplexing technique in the Gaussian
modulated CV-QKD protocol. Different from Ref.[18], each
RF oscillator is modulated with continuous phase and ampli-
tude information, while the system does not require frequency
locking. In our proposal, the subcarrier frequencies are evenly
separated. We consider the influence of nonlinear signal mix-
ing and analyze the security against collective attacks. The
results are attractive. The Gaussian modulation of each chan-
nel will introduce a non-Gaussian extra noise which is gen-
erated from the continuous information modulated on other
channels. This extra noise is proportional to Alice’s modula-
tion variance and cannot be neglected.
We evaluate the secret key bit rate in the asymptotic limit
for both each channel and the whole system. Results indicate
that the extra source noise will slightly reduce of the max-
imum transmission distance, while the total secret key rate
can be considerably increased. Also each channel could gen-
erate the independent secret keys at the same time, meaning
the key distribution in the multi-channel system is parallel.
This scheme could be used to distribute keys to multi-users.
Combined with current WDM technique, the multi-channel
scheme has the potential to construct a CV-QKD network.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec.II, a brief review
of the Gaussian protocol is given. In Sec.III, we describes the
principle of the multi-channel scheme. In Sec.IV the effect
2the nonlinear signal mixing is studied to derive the expression
of the extra source noise due to intermodulaton. We construct
the entanglement-based scheme in Sec.V and use it to analyze
the security under collective attacks. The results of numerical
simulation and the discussion are provided in Sec.VI and the
conclusions are drawn in Sec.VII.
II. BRIEF REVIEW OF THE GAUSSIAN PROTOCOL
The Gaussian CV-QKD protocols are based on the Gaus-
sian modulation of a Gaussian state of light which could be co-
herent state[4], squeezed state[19] or thermal state[20]. From
practical point of view, the most suitable protocol for exper-
imental demonstration is the Gaussian modulated coherent
state(GMCS) quantum cryptography protocol, which was pro-
posed by F. Grosshans and P. Grangier in 2002[4]. The GMCS
protocol requires two independent Gaussian distributed mod-
ulation with the identical variance VA on the x and p quadra-
tures of a coherent state. Expressed in terms of phase and am-
plitude, the distribution corresponds to a uniform modulation
of the phase in [0, 2π] and a Rayleigh distribution of amplitude
with the probability density function Ray(σ = √VA) where
z ∼ Ray(σ) = z
σ2
e
− z2
2σ2 . (1)
Alice’s modulated states are sent to Bob through the quan-
tum channel. The quantum channel is featured by the trans-
mission efficiency T and excess noise ǫ, resulting in a noise
variance of 1 + T ǫ at Bob’s input. Different from DV-QKD
protocol, the GMCS protocol requires a strong local oscilla-
tor(LO). In order to ensure the LO and signal light having the
identical mode, both the LO and signal light are generated by
Alice using an unbalanced beam splitter(BS) from the same
pulsed coherent laser. Then Alice applies time multiplexing
and polarization multiplexing techniques to let the LO and
signal propagate in the same fiber.
When Bob receives the states, he first uses the demultiplex-
ing devices to separate the LO and quantum signal. Then he
performs homodyne detection, randomly measuring the x or
p quadrature. To measure the quadrature p, he dephases the
local oscillator by π/2. Then Alice and Bob performs classi-
cal data processing, including the reconciliation and privacy
amplification, and finally share the common secret keys from
the accumulated data.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE MULTI-CHANNEL SCHEME
The operation principle of the multi-channel scheme is
shown in Fig.1. Alice uses a beam splitter(BS) to separate the
coherent pulsed laser source centered at ω0 into two beams:
one is weaker and the other is stronger. The weaker beam
is prepared for generating quantum signals while the stronger
beams is used for local oscillators(LO). The optical field is
assumed to be quasi-monochrimatic, i.e. the spectral width
∆ω of the pulse spectrum is much smaller than its central fre-
quencyω0. This assumption is always satisfied when the pulse
width is larger than 0.4ps[21]. The quantized single mode
electric field ˆE(t) of the signal light before modulation can be
expressed as ˆE(t) = ˆE+(t) + ˆE−(t) where
ˆE+(t) = i
√
~ω0
2ǫ0V0
aˆ(0)e−iω0t (2)
and ˆE−(t) = [ ˆE+(t)]†. ǫ0 is the dielectric permittivity and V0
denotes the mode volume. i is the imaginary unit. E+(t) and
E−(t) denote the positive-frequency and negative-frequency
components of the quantized electric field, respectively. aˆ(0)
is the dimensionless complex amplitude operator which can
decomposed by two quadratures as aˆ(0) = ˆX + i ˆP. Since
ˆE+(t) and ˆE−(t) are conjugated, we only need to consider the
positive-frequency component in following discussions, while
the identical results could be obtained from the negative one
by similar methods.
Signal light is externally modulated through a phase
modulator(PM1) by N radio-frequency(RF) subcarriers. Each
subcarrier, which is generated from a voltage control oscilla-
tor(VCO) of frequency Ωk, k ∈ {1, 2..., N}, is independently
amplitude-modulated by a Rayleigh distributed random num-
ber Vk and phase-modulated by a uniform distributed random
number φk ∈ [0, 2π]. All the modulated RF signals are com-
bined together with a bias voltage Vb. Then the voltage ap-
plied on PM1 is expressed as
VS (t) = −
N∑
k=1
Vk cos(Ωkt + φk) − Vb. (3)
After Alice’s phase modulation, the positive-frequency com-
ponent turns to:
ˆE+S (t) = ˆE+(t) exp
[
− iπV(t)
Vπ
]
= ˆE+(t)eiθb exp
i N∑
k=1
mk cos(Ωkt + φk)
, (4)
where mk = Vkπ/Vπ, θb = Vb/Vπ. Vπ is the half-wave voltage
of the phase modulator. This equation can be written as Taylor
expansion with following form
ˆE+S (t) = ˆE+(t)eiθb
+∞∑
n=0
in
n!
 N∑
k=1
mk cos(Ωkt + φk)
n
 ˆE+(t)eiθb
[
1 + i
2
N∑
k=−N
k,0
mke
−i(Ωk t+φk)
+
i2
8
N∑
r,s=−N
r,s,0
mrmse
−i[(Ωr+Ωs)t+φr+φs]
]
, (5)
where we define m−k = mk, Ω−k = −Ωk and φ−k = −φk for any
integer |k| ∈ {1, ..., N}. Here we use the second-order Taylor
expansion because when mk is small enough, e.g. mk ≤ 0.02,
the effect of higher-order terms is negligible[17]. Then the
signal field at frequency ω0 + Ωk is:
ˆE+S |ω0+Ωk (t) =
1
2
ˆE+(t)e−iΩk t+iθbCk, (6)
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FIG. 1. (Color online) System layout of the multi-channel parallel CV-QKD scheme. The signal light is in red solid line and the local oscillator
light is in red dashed line.
where
Ck = imke−iφk +
i2
4
N∑
r,s=−N
r,s,0
Ωr+Ωs=Ωk
mrmse
−i(φr+φs). (7)
Similar as the form of Eq.(2), we can rewritten the expres-
sion of ˆE+S |ω0+Ωk as following:
ˆE+S |ω0+Ωk (t) =
√
~(ω0 + Ωk)
2ǫ0V
aˆk(0)e−i(ω0+Ωk), (8)
where aˆk(0) = XS (k) + iPS (k) is a new dimensionless complex
amplitude operator of mode ω0 +Ωk and can be expressed as:
aˆk(0) = 12
√
ω0 + Ωk
ω0
Ckeiθb aˆ(0)  12Cke
−iθb aˆ(0). (9)
If we adjust the bias phase θb to − arg(αˆ(0)) − π/2, then the
X quadrature of aˆk(0) becomes
XS (k) =
α0
2
mk cos(−φk) + α08
N∑
r,s=−N
r,s,0
Ωr+Ωs=Ωk
mrms sin(φr + φs),(10)
where α0 denotes the norm of aˆ(0). The expression of P(k) can
be obtained by interchanging the sin(·) and cos(·) functions in
Eq.(10). The compound signal then passes through an opti-
cal filter, which blocks all the subcarriers below the frequency
ω0. This is because the subcarrier phase modulation in PM1
encodes the same information (mk and φk) on both the subcar-
riers centered at ω0 + Ωk and ω0 − Ωk, while we only use the
positive frequency components for quantum key distribution.
The local oscillator(LO) light can also be generated by the
similar way as the signal light. The difference is that the volt-
age applied on the LO’s modulator does not contain randomly
modulated information. Therefore the modulation voltage of
LO can be written as:
VLO(t) = −VL
N∑
k=1
cos(Ωkt) − V ′b, (11)
where VL is the amplitude voltage of each RF component
and V ′b is the bias voltage. Since LO is usually much
larger(typically 106 ∼ 108 times) than the quantum signal,
it can be deemed as a classical optical field El(t) = E0e−iω0t.
So the LO light after modulator PM2 is:
ELO(t)  El(t)eiψb
[
1 + imL
2
N∑
k=−N
k,0
e−iΩkt
+
i2m2L
8
N∑
r,s=−N
r,s,0
e−i(Ωr+Ωs)t
]
, (12)
where mL = VL/Vπ and ψb = V ′b/Vπ. If bias phase ψb is adjust
to −π/2, then the local oscillator light at frequency ω0 +Ωk is
ELO |ω0+Ωk (t) =
1
2
E0e−i(ω0+Ωk)tDk, (13)
4in which the parameter Dk is:
Dk = mL +
i
4
M2(N, k)m2L, (14)
where M2(N, k) is the numbers of terms satisfied Ωr + Ωs =
Ωk, (|r|, |s| ∈ {1, ..., N}). The values of M2(N, k) can be calcu-
lated by enumeration method. We also derive the analytical
expression of M2(N, k) as
M2(N, k) = 2N − k − 32 −
1
2(−1)
k. (15)
For a given total channel numbers N, M2(N, k) satisfies the
following inequation:
N − 2 ≤ M2(N, k) ≤ 2N − 2. (16)
When mL ≤ 0.01 and N ≤ 40, the impact introduced by non-
linear signal mixing on |Dk| is less than 1.5%, which could be
neglected. Therefore the LO field of each channel has the con-
stant value ELO |ω0+Ωk = 12 E0mLe−i(ω0+Ωk)t as shown in Fig1. In
order to reduce the effect of scattering and nonlinearity in the
fiber, the LO power should not be high enough. As the signal
light, the LO is also filtered the subcarriers below ω0. Then
the compound signal light and LO light are polarization mul-
tiplexed into the quantum channel and transmitting to Bob.
After receiving the states sent by Alice, Bob firstly sep-
arates the compound signal and LO by using a polariza-
tion beam splitter(PBS). Then he uses an Erbium-doped op-
tical fiber amplifier(EDFA) to amplify the LO to a consider-
able power and randomly phases the LO by {0, π/2} to se-
lect the measurement basis. The random basis choosing pro-
cedure is determined by a binary random number generator
which Bob holds its result as RB. He then uses two arrayed-
waveguide gratings(AWG) to filter out each subcarrier and
performs balanced homodyne detection on each pairs of sig-
nal and LO(both are centered at frequency ω0 + Ωk). Finally,
Alice and Bob perform classical data processing, including
the reverse reconciliation and the privacy amplification. Af-
ter these stages, they share N channel independent secret keys
and the key distribution is completed.
In this paper, we consider three different frequency spacing
plans: the low-plan(N = 5) with evenly spaced(e.g. Ωk =
kΩ1) channels from 5 to 25GHz, the medium-plan(N = 15)
with evenly spaced channels from 2 to 30GHz and the high-
plan(N = 40) with evenly spaced channels from 1 to 40GHz.
From practical point of view, 40GHz phase modulators are
currently commercially available and the ultra-narrow band
AWG devices with 1GHz channel spacing have been experi-
mentally demonstrated[22]. So it is reasonable for us consid-
ering these cases.
IV. EXTRA SOURCE NOISE DUE TO
INTERMODULATION
According to the Eq.(10), the expression of XS (k) can be
written as two parts:
XS (k) = XA(k) + ∆X(k), (17)
where
XA(k) =
α0
2
mk cos(−φk)
∆X(k) =
α0
8
N∑
r,s=−N
r,s,0
Ωr+Ωs=Ωk
mrms sin(φr + φs).
(18)
Since mk follows a Rayleigh distribution R(σ) and φk follows
a uniform distribution in [0, 2π], XA(k) follows the Gaussian
distribution N(0, σα0/2), which is identical to the modulation
in Gaussian CV-QKD protocol. The second part, ∆X(k), can be
seen as a modulation noise. Notice that
mrms sin(φr + φs) = xr ps + pr xs, (19)
where xr = mr cos φr, pr = mr sin φr, xs = ms cos φs and
ps = ms sin φs. For different r and s, the random variables
xr, pr, xs, ps are mutually independent and follow the same
Gaussian distribution N(0, σ). Hence the probability density
function of xr ps(also for xs pr) is given by[23]
f (z) =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
e
− x2
2σ2
σ
√
2π
e
− y2
2σ2
σ
√
2π
δ(xy − z)dxdy
=
1
πσ2
K0
( |z|
σ2
)
, (20)
where K0(·) is the zero order modified Bessel function of the
second kind and δ(·) is the delta function. The mean values
of the products are 〈xr ps〉 = 〈xs pr〉 = 0 while the variances
are 〈(xr ps)2〉 = 〈(xs pr)2〉 = σ4. So the variance of the term
mrms sin(φr + φs) is
〈(mrms sin(φr + φs))2〉 =
2σ2 for r , s4σ2 for r = s (21)
As shown in Sec.II, the total number of combinations sat-
isfied Ωs + Ωr = Ωk is M2(N, k). For an odd integer k, the
combination 2Ωs = Ωk does not exist, so Ωk can only be
decomposed by the combinations of Ωr + Ωs, r , s. Since
Ωr and Ωs are commutable, the term mrms sin(φr + φs) exists
twice. Therefore 〈∆X(k)〉 = 0 and the variance of ∆X can be
expressed as
〈∆X2(k)〉 =
α20
64
[
M2(N, k)
2 × 4 × 2σ
4
]
=
α20
16 M2(N, k)σ
4. (22)
When k is an even integer, there is one combination 2Ωs = Ωk.
So in this case 〈∆X2S (k)〉 becomes:
〈∆X2(k)〉 =
α20
64
[
M2(N, k) − 1
2
× 4 × 2σ4 + 4σ4
]
=
α20
16 M2(N, k)σ
4,
(23)
which is identical with the case of odd k. The variance of∆P(k)
can be derived in the similar way. We assign the variance of
XA(k) as VA = α20σ
2/4. Since mk ∼ Ray(σ), the mean value of
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Source noise to modulation variance ratio
ǫS (k)/VA in terms of the channel index k. The total channel number is
N = 40 and the mean value of mk is 0.01.
mk should be mk = σ
√
π/2. Then the variance of variance of
X(k) can be expressed in terms of mk and VA as
ǫS (k) , 〈∆X2(k)〉 = 〈∆P2(k)〉 =
1
2π
M2(N, k)m2kVA, (24)
and finally we get
〈X2S (k)〉 = 〈P2S (k)〉 = VA + ǫS (k), (25)
where ǫS (k) is the noise variance due to intermodulation de-
fined in Eq.(24). From a physical point of view, the gener-
ation of ǫS (k) is the result of the nonlinear mixing between
different modulated RF signals. As shown in Eq.(3) and (4),
although the RF voltages are combined linearly, phase modu-
lation is not a linear process. Therefore the quadratures of a
certain channel will be effected by the nonlinear mixing from
other channels. In addition, since the modulated information
of each channel is independent, the extra source noise is also
independent of the the Gaussian modulation of each channel.
Hence it could be treated as a noise term in our analysis.
Fig.2 shows the ratio ǫS (k)/VA in terms of the channel index
k when N = 40. We find that the first channel (k = 1) has
the maximum value of 0.00124 while the last channel (k = N)
has the minimum one of 0.0006. Other channels are placed
between the first and last cases. When N is large, e.g. N = 40,
the maximal value of ǫS (k)/VA is approximately double of the
minimal one.
Notice that although each quadrature of VA follows a Gaus-
sian distribution, ǫS (k) is not a Gaussian noise. This situation
is different from previous study about the source noise which
assuming to be Gaussian[24, 25]. According to Eq.(24), since
the extra source noise is proportional to VA, it cannot be sup-
pressed by increasing the variance of the modulation and then
attenuating the state. So this noise must be taken into account
in both theoretical analysis and actual experiments.
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Alice
Src
Bob
Quantum
Channel
XA(k)               PA(k)
Mod
RND
Fred
(δX(k),δP(k))
ΔX(k)         ΔP(k)
(X(k),P(k))
Eve
RND
Imperfect
Detector
(a)
v H
G
Alice
ρAB0
Bob
Quantum
Channel
XA(k)
Eve
Fred
PA(k)
A B0
Hom
η 
B1B
b
F
(X(k),P(k))(X´(k) ,P´(k))
vac
(b)
FIG. 4. (Color online) The entanglement-based scheme of the kth
channel. Fred is assumed to be a neutral party and Eve cannot ben-
efit from neither Fred’s information nor the imperfections of Bob’s
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V. SECURITY OF THE MULTI-CHANNEL SCHEME
A. Entanglement-based scheme
In the prepare and measurement scheme of the kth channel:
X(k) = XA(k) + ∆X(k) + δX(k)
P(k) = PA(k) + ∆P(k) + δP(k), (26)
6where δX(k) and δP(k) are originated from shot noise and sat-
isfy the relation that 〈δX2(k)〉 = 〈δP2(k)〉 = 1(in shot noise unit).
XA(k) and PA(k) are Alice’s modulated random numbers and
satisfy the Gaussian distribution that N(0,VA). ∆X(k) and
∆P(k) are the added non-Gaussian noise with variance ǫS (k).
So the variance of X(k) and P(k) are:
〈X2(k)〉 = 〈P2(k)〉 = VA + 1 + ǫS (k). (27)
And the conditional variances VX(k) |XA(k) and VP(k)|PA(k) are[26]:
VX(k) |XA(k) = 〈X2(k)〉 −
〈X(k)XA(k)〉2
〈X2A(k)〉
= 1 + ǫS (k)
VP(k) |PA(k) = 〈P2(k)〉 −
〈P(k)PA(k)〉2
〈P2A(k)〉
= 1 + ǫS (k). (28)
In the equivalent entanglement-based scheme, which is
shown in Fig.4(b), Fred generates a pure three-mode entangle-
ment state |ΨABF(k)〉 satisfied trF (|ΨABF(k)〉〈ΨABF(k) |) = ρAB0(k).
The quadratures (X(k), P(k)) denote the state sent to Bob, and
(X′(k), P′(k)) denote the state kept by Alice. Here we assume that
(X(k), P(k)) and (X′(k), P′(k)) satisfy the following relations:
〈X′2(k)〉 = 〈P′2(k)〉 = V, 〈X2(k)〉 = 〈P2(k)〉 = V + ǫS (k), (29)
where V = VA + 1. According to the uncertainty relation[26],
we have
|〈X(k)X′(k)〉2| ≤ V(V + ǫS (k)) − VV + ǫS (k) . (30)
Since the three-party system ABF may not be maximally en-
tangled, the correlation between modes A and B0 may not sat-
urate the limit in Eq.(30). So it can be reasonably assumed
that
〈X(k)X′(k)〉 =
√
V2 − 1, 〈P(k)P′(k)〉 = −
√
V2 − 1. (31)
In the E-B scheme, when Alice takes a heterodyne detection
on X′(k) and P′(k) simultaneously, the measurement values can
be expressed as X′A(k) = X′(k) − δX′A(k) and P′A(k) = P′(k) −
δP′A(k), where 〈(δX′A(k))2〉 = 〈(δP′A(k))2〉 = 1. Alice’s best
estimation of (X′(k), P′(k)) is denoted by (XA(k), PA(k)) which
satisfied[26]
XA(k) =
√
V − 1
V + 1
X′A(k), PA(k) = −
√
V − 1
V + 1
P′A(k), (32)
and finally we have 〈X2A(k)〉 = 〈P2A(k)〉 = VA and VX(k)|XA(k) =
VP(k) |PA(k) = 1 + ǫS (k), which has the identical results as in the
P&M scheme. If we hide the entanglement source and Alice’s
detection in a black box, the eavesdropper cannot distinguish
which scheme is applied. So we can conclude that this E-B
scheme is equivalent to the P&M scheme.
In the P&M scheme, Bob’s imperfect detector is featured
by a detection efficiency η and the electric noise variance vel.
We could define an added noise χh referred to Bob’s input
as χh = (1 − η + vel)/η. In the E-B scheme, it is mod-
eled by a beam splitter with transmission of η coupled with
an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen(EPR) state of variance v. So in
the E-B scheme, the added noise referred to Bob’s input is
(1− η)v/η. To make the detection-added noise equal, the vari-
ance v should be chosen as v = (1 − η + vel)/(1 − η).
B. Security against collective attacks
In this section, we consider the security of the multi-
channel CV-QKD protocol with reverse reconciliation. Ac-
cording to the fact that coherent attacks are the most powerful
eavesdropping attacks and are not more efficient than collec-
tive attacks[10, 11], we will analyze the security against col-
lective attacks.
Since the quadrature information of each channel is inde-
pendent, we assume Eve’s attacks of every channel also inde-
pendent of others. Fred is supposed to be a neutral party which
can not be controlled by the eavesdropper[28]. This situation
implies that both Alice and Eve cannot benefit from the infor-
mation kept by Fred. Then the secret key rate(bit/pulse) of the
kth channel is expressed as
K(k) = βIAB − S BE , (33)
where β is the efficiency of reverse reconciliation assumed to
be constant for each channel. IAB, which represents the Shan-
non mutual information between Alice and Bob, can be de-
rived from Bob’s measured variance VB1 and the conditional
variance VB1|A as
IAB =
1
2
log2
VB1(k)
VB1|A
=
1
2
log2
V + ǫS (k) + χtot
1 + ǫS (k) + χtot
, (34)
where χtot = χline + χh/T and χline = 1/T − 1. T is the trans-
mission efficiency of the quantum channel and can be evalu-
ated by the transmission distance L by T = 10−0.02L. Eve’s
information on Bob’s measurement is given by the Holevo
bound[27]:
S BE = S (ρE) − S (ρE|B=b), (35)
where S (·) denotes the von-Neumann entropy and b represents
the measurement result of Bob. Here we consider Alice and
Fred together as a larger state A′. Since the fact that Eve has
the ability to purify the system A′B, we have S (ρE) = S (ρA′B).
After Bob’s measurement, the global pure state collapses to
ρA′EGH|b , so S (ρE|b) = S (ρA′GH|b). Notice that the state ρA′GH|b
is determined by state ρA′B[24]. According to the optimality of
Gaussian attacks[10, 11], S BE reaches its maximum when the
state ρA′B(i.e. ρFAB) is Gaussian. Then the Eve’s information
can be bounded by
S BE ≤ S GBE = S (ρGFAB) − S (ρGFAGH|b), (36)
where ρGFAB is a Gaussian state with the covariance matrix[28]
γGFAB =

F11 F12 F13
F21 VI2
√
T (V2 − 1)σz
F31
√
T (V2 − 1)σz T (V + ǫS (k) + χline)I2
 , (37)
which is identical to the covariance matrix of ρFAB. I2 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
and σz =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
. Fm,n represents the unknown 2 × 2 matrix
describing either F or its correlations with AB. Although the
7entropy of ρGFAB can not be calculated directly, there exists
another Gaussian state ρ′GFAB with the covariance matrix γ′GFAB
γ′GFAB =

I2 0 0
0 V ′I2
√
T (V ′2 − 1)σz
0
√
T (V ′2 − 1)σz T (V ′ + χline)I2
 , (38)
where V ′ = V + ǫS (k). The reduced state ρ′GB = trFA(ρ′GFAB)
is identical to the reduced state ρGB = trFA(ρGFAB), therefore
ρGFAB can be changed to ρ
′G
FAB through a unitary transformation
UFA[29]. Then we have S (ρ′GFAB) = S (ρGFAB). Similarly, the
conditional state ρGFAGH|b can be transforms into the ρ
′G
FAGH|b
through UFA , then S (ρ′GFAGH|b) = S (ρGFAGH|b). Therefore we
have
S BE ≤ S GBE = S (ρ′GFAB) − S (ρ′GFAGH|b), (39)
and the lower bound K˜(k) of the secret key rate can be ex-
pressed as
K˜(k) = βIAB − S GBE ,
= βIAB −
3∑
j=1
G
(
λ j − 1
2
)
+
7∑
j=4
G
(
λ j − 1
2
)
, (40)
where G(x) = (x + 1) log2(x + 1) − x log2 x. The first three
sympletic eigenvalues λ1,2,3 ≥ 1, which are derived from the
covariance matrix γ′GFAB, can be expressed as
λ21,2 =
1
2
(A ±
√
A2 − 4B), λ3 = 1, (41)
where
A = (V + ǫS (k))2 − 2T [(V + ǫS (k))2 − 1]
+T 2(V + ǫS (k) + χline)2
B = T 2[1 + (V + ǫS (k))χline]2. (42)
The symplectic eigenvalues λ4,5,6,7 ≥ 1 can be obtained from
the covariance matrix γ′GFAGH|b and have the following form
λ24,5 =
1
2
(C ±
√
C2 − 4D), λ6,7 = 1, (43)
where
C =
Aχh + (V + ǫS (k))
√
B + T (V + ǫS (k) + χline)
T (V + ǫS (k) + χline) + χh
D =
√
B(V + ǫS (k)) + Bχh
T (V + ǫS (k) + χline) + χh , (44)
where A and B are given in Eq.(42). Based on Eq.(41), (42),
(43) and (44), we can calculate the asymptotic lower bound of
the secret key rate in Eq.(40) against collective attacks.
VI. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
For a given total channel number N, the bit rate of the secret
key of the kth channel is given as
R(k) = frepK˜(k), (45)
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FIG. 5. (Color online) The secret key bit rate R(k) as a function of
transmission distance L of the first and last channel. Curves from left
to right are (N, k) = (40, 1), (40, 40), (15, 1), (15, 15), (5, 1), (5, 5)
and single channel case.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) The total secret key bit rate Rtot as a function
of transmission distance L in cases of different channel plans. From
top to bottom: N = 40, 15, 5 and signal channel case.
where K˜(k) is the secret key bit per pulse and can be evalu-
ated using Eq.(33). We assume the system repetition rate frep,
quantum efficiency η and the electronic noise of homodyne
detector vel as frep = 1MHz, η = 0.552 and vel = 0.015, corre-
sponding to the typical experimental parameters[8]. The ex-
cess noise ǫ is assumed to be ǫ = 0.02 which is a conservative
value[6]. The reverse reconciliation is set to β = 0.93 which is
an achievable value with existing techniques[15]. We choose
VA = 10 as the modulation variance at Alice’s side.
According the Fig.2, since the first and last channels have
the maximal and minimal extra source noise, we only need to
evaluate the secret key of these two channels while the other
channels are placed between them. Fig.5 shows the secret key
bit rate for the first(k = 1) and last(k = N) channel in cases
of N = 5, 15, 40. For each case, the k = N channel always
performs best among all the channels in both secret key rate
and the maximum transmission distance while the k = 1 chan-
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FIG. 7. (Color online)The multi-channel gain of the system. (a) is
the function of mk at the distance of L = 50km. (b) is the function
of transmission distance when mk = 0.01. Curves from top to bot-
tom are N = 40, 15 and 5. Dashed lines act as a reference. Other
parameters: β = 0.93, ǫ = 0.02, η = 0.552, vel = 0.015 and VA = 10.
nel performs the worst. This is because the extra source noise
introduced by intermodulation is a decreasing function of the
channel index k as shown in Fig.2 and a increasing function
of the total channel number N as shown in Fig3. Due to the
extra source noise, the maximum transmission distance and
the secret key rate of the subcarrier channels are smaller than
single-channel CV-QKD.
The total secret key bit rate can be defined as a sum of key
rate of each channel
Rtot =
N∑
k=1
R(k). (46)
Rtot as a function of transmission distance L is demonstrated
in Fig.6. The total secret key bit rate is considerably increased
with the channel numbers N from zero to 80km. Interestingly,
the maximum transmission distance is decreased N. We also
find that the high-count channel system(e.g.N = 40) may per-
forms worse than the mid-count and low-count channel sys-
tems in certain distance ranges(90∼110km). This is mainly
due to the fact that Rtot of the high-count system starts to go
down and falls to zero rapidly, while at this distance the low-
count system still has positive key rate.
In order to estimate the increment on the secret key bit rate
of multi-channel protocol, we define the multi-channel gain as
GM =
Rtot
Rsc
=
1
Rsc
N∑
k=1
R(k), (47)
where Rsc represents the secret key bit rate of a single-channel
CV-QKD with the identical parameters as those in the multi-
channel scheme. Fig7(a) shows the evolution of GM as a func-
tion of the mean value of mk at the distance of L = 50km. For
mk ≤ 0.005, the effect of nonlinear signal mixing can be ne-
glected and the multi-channel gain is almost identical to the
number of channels(N). With the increase of mk, GM is re-
duced, so GM ≤ N. Fig.7(b) demonstrates the relation be-
tween GM and the transmission distance L with mk = 0.01.
GM descends rapidly with the increment of L and finally falls
to zero when Rtot reaches its maximum transmission distance.
In short distance ranges(e.g. L ≤ 30km), the multi-channel
system has a great improvement on the total secret key bit rate
with a gain of about N times.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we present a scheme for continuous variable
quantum key distribution using the subcarrier multiplexing
technique in microwave photonics. We study the generation
of both the subcarrier signal and the local oscillator light. We
also analyze the influence of nonlinear signal mixing and the
extra source noise due to intermodulation. We find the ex-
tra source noise is non-Gaussian distributed and proportional
to the modulation variance VA. Then we investigate the se-
curity against collective attacks and evaluate the lower bound
for the secret key rate. Our results show that by using this
multiplexing technique, the maximum transmission distance
of each channel will decreased slightly, while the total secret
key rate could have a considerable improvement.
We also notice that our scheme could be used for key dis-
tribution for multi users. As shown in Sec.IV, each channel
generates an independent secret key at the same time, mean-
ing the key distribution in the multi-channel system is par-
allel. This scheme could be used for one Alice to distribute
keys to several Bobs. Limited by the electro-optic modula-
tors, the bandwidth occupied by the multi-channel scheme is
under 100GHz, which is smaller than the interval of WDM
devices. So several multi-channel CV-QKD systems with dif-
ferent central frequencies could be combined with WDM de-
vices, resulting in a potential to construct a CV-QKD network.
Future work will be the experiments of generating the
multi-channel signals and the demonstration of the multi-
channel CV-QKD system. This work is supported by
the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant
Nos. 61170228), and China Postdoctoral Science Foundation
(Grant No. 2013M540365).
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